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CAROLE JONES
James Kelman’s Melancholic Politics
‘Also I am a man, a human man. Frailty is inherent in me. But what
do we mean by ‘‘frailty’’ in a context that is utterly and only human?
I do confess that I hold many weaknesses of a personal nature.’
James Kelman, You Have to be Careful in the Land of the Free (2004).
‘The violence of social regulation is not to be found in its unilateral
action, but in the circuitous route by which the psyche accuses itself
of its own worthlessness.’
Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power (1997).
Abstract
This essay explores the novels of James Kelman in relation to the
theorisation of melancholia and subjectivity in the work of Judith
Butler. It relates a masculinised melancholia characterising Kelman’s
protagonists to an unacknowledged loss which I identify in general
terms as the contemporary undermining of the autonomous mascu-
line self. An originary loss for Butler institutes a process of melan-
cholic subjecti¢cation which is characterised by anxiety, self-
beratement and immobility. Acknowledgment of the precariousness
of life and its necessary interrelationality serves to break ¢xed attach-
ments to this loss and to the past and move the subject through a
process of mourning which opens the possibility of new and con-
structive engagement with life. Focusing on Kelman’s novels as
enacting an inauguration of mourning, this essay argues for the poli-
tical signi¢cance of Kelman’s literary strategies in terms of what
Butler characterises as the ‘social battleground’ of the psyche. It cul-
minates in a reading of Kelman’s latest novel, Mo said she was quirky,
as concluding a trajectory of masculine loss in Kelman’s novels.
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This essay seeks to place James Kelman’s novels in relation to con-
temporary discourses of precariousness which challenge dominant neoliberal
models of the self and their privileging of the autonomous individual. I con-
tend that Kelman’s ¢ctions are propelled by a gendered melancholia which
opens out to a radical critique of autonomy and unitary subjectivity. The
political signi¢cance of this representation can be clari¢ed when his texts are
read in the light of Judith Butler’s conceptualisation of the relation between
the psyche and the social in her theorising of the melancholically constituted
self. This approach is in contrast to a perceived ‘negativity’ in this writing
in some quarters, that it presents a catatonic entrapment of individuals in a
self-destructive cycle of anxiety, self-beratement and immobility from which
there is no escape, and that Kelman’s characters su¡er, for instance, a worry-
ing ‘awful ¢xity’ and ‘seem to be trapped’,1 making these texts politically
uninspiring. In the extreme Kelman’s inward looking, downbeat protago-
nists could be appropriated as examples of ‘possessive individualism, bour-
geois individualism, taken to its extreme’,2 as Willy Maley characterises
them, with searing irony. Butler’s work famously challenges and refutes
such an autonomous model of the self and its relationship with the social
context. Interestingly in relation to the perceived ‘entrapment’ of Kelman’s
characters, we can think of her as a ‘theorist of constraint’3 concerned with
a ‘dialectic of constraint and freedom’.4 From the perspective of Butler’s cri-
tique, I argue that Kelman’s men are not simply ‘feminised’, as suggested
by some critics as a consequence of their take-over of the critical advantages
of a feminised position;5 they can be more usefully engaged as politically
radical in their exposure of psychic pressure and processes, amounting to a
thorough undermining of a masculinised model of the autonomous subject.
I suggest here that Kelman’s novels map a trajectory of masculine loss
which culminates in the publication of Mo said she was quirky (2012) with its
female central character. Gender is therefore at the centre of this examin-
ation of Kelman’s novels, and a focus on melancholia, as explicated in the
work of Butler and others, is a useful tool in distinguishing the radical
signi¢cance of Kelman’s oeuvre.
In essence, Butler’s critical thought addresses how power acts on the indi-
vidual, how selves emerge within and in relation to a social context, and
how they are comprised and compromised by regulatory norms which
coerce compliance, a process she has described as ‘an originary complicity
with power in the formation of the ‘‘I’’ ’.6 Kelman’s ¢ctions appear to inter-
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rogate such a politically constrained position, as suggested by his focus on
the individual at the expense of the wider social fabric. This compromised,
complicit ‘I’ is Butler’s focus as she maps for us the terrain of the psyche as
it is produced in relation to the social; her model of the self has at its basis
‘a melancholia that reproduces power as the psychic voice of judgment
addressed to (turned upon) oneself, thus modelling re£exivity on subjec-
tion’.7 Though also understood by some as pessimistic, Butler presents us
with a model of subjectivity that is radical in its relationality and its inti-
mate conception of the individual as shaped by power. Though not provid-
ing easy answers to a current social predicament rife with inequality,
prejudice and state violence, her compelling vision and its implications
provide a constructive tool for reading Kelman’s ¢ction, illuminating his
oeuvre as politically prescient and even hopeful.
Kelman’s central characters, overwhelmingly male in most of his ¢ctions,
are emphatically vulnerable individuals ^ socially, psychically, physically and
economically. Such a portrayal of men continues to go against the grain of
dominant notions of masculinity and indeed hegemonic models which priori-
tise invulnerability through strength, control, success and rationality. More-
over, Kelman’s men often appear to su¡er from symptoms of melancholia, a
state of sadness akin to mourning famously theorised by Freud in terms of
feelings of dejection, grief and loss as well as self-reproach ‘and extra-
ordinary diminution of self regard’.8 Melancholia, ‘the suppressed and
ambivalent alternative to mourning’,9 signi¢es a loss which has not been per-
mitted to move through the process of mourning ^ a disavowed and there-
fore unfathomable loss. Such a state blocks these protagonists’ self-control
and agency, and their lives appear structured by the melancholic symptoms
of anxiety, unease, failure and crisis, often expressed in the self-beratement
which characterises melancholia. Just a glance at the openings of several of
Kelman’s novels illustrates this: A Disa¡ection begins with the lines: ‘Patrick
Doyle was a teacher. Gradually he had become sickened by it’ (p. 1); com-
mencing How late it was, how late Sammy wakes on the street from a stupor,
and almost immediately re£ects ‘there’s something far far wrong; ye’re no a
good man, ye’re just no a good man’ (p. 1); very early in You Have to be
Careful in the Land of the Free Jeremiah portrays himself in similarly negative
terms:
I was an ex Security operative, how Uhmerkin can ye get! Okay,
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failed Security operative. No really a failure, I just didnay make a
career out it. But add to that failed husband and failed parent, failed
father, general no fucking hoper. And now I was gaun hame, gaun
hame! I was a failed fucking immigrant! (p. 20)10
Part of my aim here is to investigate Kelman’s literary engagement with a
melancholic ‘failure’ as a kind of resistance to normative selfhood in the
manner of what Judith Halberstam has delineated as her project in The
Queer Art of Failure, where ‘resistance takes the form of investing in counter-
intuitive modes of knowing such as failure and stupidity; we might read
failure, for example, as a refusal of mastery, a critique of the intuitive connec-
tions within capitalism between success and pro¢t, and as a counter-
hegemonic discourse of losing’.11 In a similar vein, Butler echoes this
sensibility when she writes, in reference to Adorno and Foucault, of ‘the
necessity of conceiving the human in its fallibility. If we are to act ethically
[. . .] we must avow error as constitutive of who we are’.12
Of course, Kelman would not be the ¢rst or only author to associate
masculinity with failure and fallibility in the world-view of his writing.
Samuel Beckett’s work, as Jennifer Je¡ers reminds us, infamously engaged
‘folly, failure, impotence and ignorance’ to make ‘an unprecedented assault
on patriarchy and the value system of Western masculinity’.13 In a similar
vein, Kelman presents us with ‘countertypes of the male normative’,14 but
in contrast to Beckett, his representations are not solely calculated to con-
found and repulse in the manner of those particularly emasculated male
¢gures. Though Kelman’s men have been construed as victims, they survive
and portray masculine existence in the contemporary period as a perplexing
challenge to physical, spiritual and psychic well-being. Though less ab-
stracted from a concrete environment than Beckett’s characters, I contend
their challenge continues the attack on Western masculine privilege that
Je¡ers observes in Beckett, an attack that I agree to constitute as one, there-
fore, on the dominant discourses of Western culture. Foremost among those
discourses is the conceptualisation of subjectivity, and what I construe here
as Kelman’s anti-essentialist stance confronts the coherence of our intimate
notions of the nature of our selves.
For most readers, Kelman’s men are less repulsive than singularly inade-
quate to the onslaught of life, a condition which characterises not only
male, but human existence, as emphasised by Jeremiah when he declares ‘I
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didnay know how to do it properly, how to be it properly, be a human
being. What the fuck do ye do? What are the appropriate actions?’ (pp.
121^22). Such disorientation, not least between ‘doing’ and ‘being’, as well
as anxiety and self-doubt are symptomatic of Kelman’s characters. They illus-
trate selfhood as a melancholic process which o¡ers an account of the state
of humanness as constituted through vulnerability and dependency. That
these characters are mostly male only emphasises a contemporary existential
identity crisis as propelled by the decentring of masculine hegemony; in
places in this writing a dichotomy emerges between the male and the
human. Signi¢cantly, though, such a disorientated perspective informs
Butler’s expansive ideas with regard to the human and the notion of a live-
able life explored in her work, particularly post-9/11. For Butler, grief and
mourning expose what she calls the ‘precariousness’ of life and the extent to
which one’s sense of self depends on others; when we undergo the grieving
process ‘something about who we are is revealed, something that delineates
the ties we have to others, that show us that these ties constitute what we
are’.15 Such constitutive dependence breaches the autonomy of the subject
and, crucially, she relates this idea to politics:
Many people think that grief is privatising, that it returns us to a
solitary situation and is, in that sense, depoliticising. But I think it
furnishes a sense of political community of a complex order, and it
does this ¢rst of all by bringing to the fore the relational ties that
have implications for theorising fundamental dependency and ethi-
cal responsibility.16
Kelman’s character of choice, the mostly single lonely male, does not
encourage such a reading; how does his solitary, ostensibly inward-
looking perspective promote a politics of community and interrelation-
ality?
For one thing, Butler’s political aspect emerges in her understanding of
loss ^ the loss which leads to grief ^ as dispossession, as seen in her asser-
tion that there is a constituting ‘mode of dispossession that is fundamental
to who I am’.17 The concept evokes a fundamental loss, but the word can
be understood in two ways. Importantly for Butler, we are dispossessed
when we are moved to be ‘beside ourselves’ by grief or passion; in this we
are dispossessed of our autonomy by our inescapable relation with an other
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without which we lose something of ourselves. We are reminded in such
moments of ‘the fundamental sociality of embodied life, the ways in which
we are, from the start and by virtue of being a bodily being, already given
over, beyond ourselves, implicated in lives that are not our own’. Butler
emphasises in particular our initial total dependence on our primary care-
givers, a constituting vulnerability which we later disavow in our under-
standing of ourselves as autonomous beings: ‘it may be that this sphere of
dispossession is precisely the one that exposes my unknowingness, the
unconscious imprint of my primary sociality.’18 Dispossession in this sense
is therefore ‘a term that marks the limits of self-su⁄ciency and that estab-
lishes us as relational and interdependent’,19 as well as lacking in total self-
knowledge. In addition, there is the word’s more common reference to the
loss of land and community, and also the self under conditions of exploita-
tion and oppression. These two understandings are related in Butler’s theo-
rising of a subject that is therefore already outside of itself or ‘ex-centric’
from the start, subject to an inaugural dispossession and vulnerable to being
undone because of its dependence on others which unravels its delusional
autonomy. Such a model begins to explain Butler’s emphasis on the con-
stitutive relation between the psyche and the social, the personal and the
political.
Melancholia as a refusal to grieve, a refusal to acknowledge loss, envel-
ops the individual in negativity, and we see this in all Kelman’s characters,
for example here with Jeremiah: ‘I even whined when I was thinking, It
wasnay just me talking man I listened to myself thinking and yeh, that too
was a whine, it was fucking terrible’ (p. 52). In the insistent communication
of self-beratement, as in Jeremiah’s whine, the melancholic’s narcissistic self-
regard constructs a negative judgment of the self which in its extreme can
express itself in a self-destructive violence; and thoughts of suicide permeate
Kelman’s narratives: ‘All he sought was death’ we are told about Patrick
Doyle, ‘Death: purely and simple: simply and pure’ (p. 216). How is this
related to the politics of a social context? As Butler notes:
The social world appears to be eclipsed in melancholy, and an inter-
nal world structured in ambivalence emerges as the consequence. It
is not immediately clear how melancholy might be read, then, in
terms of social life, in particular, in terms of the social regulation of
psychic life.20
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In The Psychic Life of Power Butler goes on to continue to interrogate this
problem of how ‘psychic and social domains are produced in relation to one
another’ that she begins in Gender Trouble as a radical critique of the autono-
mous subject, and to which melancholia emerges as the key. In this process
the loss of a loved one or loved thing (which, according to Freud, can be
‘one’s country, liberty, an ideal, and so on’21) is not resolved; the loss is
denied by substituting the lost object in the ego, an identi¢cation which
internalises the trace of, and preserves the attachment to, the lost object ^ it
is as if it was never lost. However, Butler argues that it is precisely this
‘turn from object to ego that makes the distinction between them possible
[. . .] that forms the ego to begin with’;22 that is, the ‘interior’ psychic life
of the subject is made possible by that turn, which initiates an ongoing pro-
cess of subjectivisation through which the subject is constituted. Melan-
cholia, then, is central to this constitution. Ambivalence towards the lost
object ^ desire alongside anger towards it ^ ‘splits the ego into the critical
agency and the ego as object of criticism and judgment’ (p. 180), causing
the self-beratement for which melancholia is known, as this critical ‘con-
science’ becomes the mechanism by which the self is constantly rebuked for
failing to live up to an unattainable ideal. The object of criticism is now the
self, a situation which can ultimately threaten death in its potential violence.
For Butler, though, this self-directed violence is connected with the
social as it is social power which ‘regulates what will and will not be
grieved; in the social foreclosure of grief we might ¢nd what fuels the inter-
nal violence of conscience’ (p. 187). The process of an originary loss con-
stitutive of the subject ^ the incest taboo in Freud; the proscription of
homosexual attachments for Butler ^ is echoed and reiterated in the further
losses of objects and ideals which are subject to social proscription. The dis-
avowal of loss and refusal to mourn which instigates melancholia is there-
fore intimately related to social context and a result of regulatory power: it
is this process which Butler describes when she writes, ‘The violence of
social regulation is not to be found in its unilateral action, but in the circui-
tous route by which the psyche accuses itself of its own worthlessness’ (p.
184). For such an outcome, normative social regulation is implicated in a
sense of self that is distanced and cut o¡ from the world in its ‘substitution
of psychic parts and antagonisms for external relations among social actors’
(p. 179). Further, Butler directly relates this melancholic subject to state
power:
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Figured within the workings of the psyche is the power of the state
to preempt an insurrectionary rage. The ‘critical agency’ of the
melancholic is at once a social and psychic instrument. This super-
egoic conscience is not simply analogous to the state’s military
power over its citizenry; the state cultivates melancholia among its
citizenry precisely as a way of dissimulating and displacing its own
ideal authority. The process of forming the subject is a process of
rendering the terrorising power of the state invisible ^ and e¡ective
^ as the ideality of conscience. (p. 190)
Similar terms resonate through the Kelmanesque in his equally shattering
vision of the relationship of the individual and society. The same internal
landscape of the psyche, popularly interpreted as a site of personal failure
and crisis in Kelman, is here in Butler a vividly drawn social battleground.
This battleground echoes in Kelman’s characterisation of writing as a type
of guerrilla class warfare (see, for instance ‘Make Yer Point’23). Yet if
Butler’s vision leads us back to the social, it is conceived in a very di¡erent
register: ‘to claim life in such circumstances’ she writes, ‘is to contest the
righteous psyche, not by an act of will, but by submission to a sociality’;24
that is, we could say, not by individual strength but by individual surrender
to social connection and interrelationality.
Ultimately, Butler argues, the social circumscription of what constitutes a
grievable life de¢nes what is understood as a human life: ‘certain human
lives are more grievable than others’25 she contends, referring speci¢cally to
the victims of contemporary global con£icts. And further, she asks under
what circumstances does the human become culturally intelligible? How do
cultural discourses qualify what is recognised as human? Butler’s concerns
are echoed in Kelman’s frequently reiterated apprehension concerning the
limitations of the recognition of the human, particularly but not solely in
relation to class representation in English literature:
People from communities like mine were rarely to be found on
these pages. When they were they were usually categorised as ser-
vants, peasants, criminal elements, semi-literate drunken louts, and
so on; shadowy presences left unspeci¢ed, often grouped under
terms like ‘uncouth rabble’, ‘vulgar mob’, ‘the great unwashed’;
‘lumpen proletariat’, even ‘riotous assembly’ (an obscure hint that
political activism by these lower-order beings was not unheard
of).26
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The variable perspectives and boundaries of humanness as discerned by
Kelman testify to its instability. There is a gap, then, between the experien-
cing of the human self (Kelman and his community) and its ‘capture’ in
many strains of mainstream representation. There is a loss of the human for
the people implicated in these objectifying epithets. For her part, Butler sees
such a situation as a political opportunity:
I may feel that without some recognisability I cannot live. But I
may also feel that the terms by which I am recognised make life un-
livable. This is the juncture from which critique emerges, where
critique is understood as an interrogation of the terms by which life
is constrained in order to open up the possibility of di¡erent modes
of living; in other words, not to celebrate di¡erence as such but to
establish more inclusive conditions for sheltering and maintaining
life that resists models of assimilation.27
Kelman’s writing is such a juncture; it is a mode of critique of liveability
under the present polity.
Kelman’s ¢ctions, understood as examples of melancholic subjectivity,
create a complex and suggestive evocation of a world structured by an ato-
mising and striating social power, a¡ording a radical critique. The anguish
of his characters is central to that project. As Moya Lloyd interprets Butler,
‘grief is a pre-requisite for the kind of identi¢cation with su¡ering that
Butler argues might foster ethical responsibilities towards the other’;28 it
opens us to vulnerability which enables a recognition of dependence and a
new way of being with the other. It may be the case that ‘in seeing the inter-
subjective or communal dimension of experience as a condition of vulner-
ability, Butler reveals a sensibility that is sombre, almost tragic’,29 but such
an outlook necessarily challenges violent assertions of invulnerability in con-
temporary discourses of individualism and nationalism and beyond, such as
the ‘war on terror’. Vulnerability, produced by our grief or acknowl-
edgment of loss, is crucial to our existence. As Butler writes, ‘Survival is a
matter of avowing the trace of loss that inaugurates one’s own emer-
gence’;30 that is, our acceptance of the constitutive relation with other(s)
which brings us into being is necessary to keep us safely alive. And acknowl-
edging loss and vulnerability is a touchstone of Kelman’s writing, as
evoked by Jeremiah in connection with the interpersonal: ‘How do we say
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it about people, the ones that bring a smile to the face. We get a gift from
them. It connects to vulnerability and it maybe happens mair with women
than men because we expect their vulnerability to be less visible’ (p. 55).
Before considering how in Kelman’s work the acknowledging of loss
leads back to the interrelational context of the social, we should ¢rst address
the manner in which we can discern a constituting melancholia in Kelman’s
¢ctions. Is it possible to say through what losses it is induced? The concept
of melancholia has been made use of in various di¡erent analyses of a range
of challenging contexts. In one prescient example, Angela McRobbie has
proposed that ‘feminism has become, for young women, in rather indis-
cernible ways, an object of loss and melancholia’.31 In this argument a ‘post-
feminist’ social context has ‘taken feminism into account’ (p. 60) so that it
is no longer needed, feminism’s language, symbolism and equality aims
appropriated in the incorporation of young women into a neo-liberal cul-
ture of corporate work and consumerism that requires the abandoning of a
critique of patriarchy, producing as an outcome the re-traditionalisation of
gender roles ^ ‘feminism undone’ (p. 60). As McRobbie describes it:
In abandoning or repudiating [. . .] feminist ideals which would
seek to challenge this narrow grid of intelligibility, something is
lost and what exactly it is that is lost becomes opaque, and the ‘vio-
lence of regulatory norms’ gives rise to a melancholia. This female
melancholia and its attendant patterns of self-beratement can be
understood as responses to such a loss. (p. 118)
We can easily perceive the formative in£uence of Butler here, and also
McRobbie admits her debt to Wendy Brown’s employing of ‘Left melan-
cholia’, an attachment to outmoded ideals, analyses, and strategies which
stymie reaction to the present moment in Left political movements.32
For both McRobbie and Brown, then, the concept of melancholia aids
analysis as a tool of radical political perspectives. Aaron Kelly engages the
term in a slightly di¡erent manner in relation to Kelman’s work. He sug-
gests that a novel such as A Disa¡ection ‘arrives at what I will term a melan-
choly knowledge or truth’ and he describes it as follows:
It is a melancholy knowledge in this novel because it mourns
the loss of some pure truth uncontaminated by the instrumental
domination of the Enlightenment’s own concept and the horrors
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committed in the name of the latter. Yet A Disa¡ection also yearns
for the persistence of truth, for a critical engagement with the
world, even as it acknowledges the fragmentary, fractious and pro-
visional nature of that knowledge. A melancholy knowledge is still
a form of knowing though it exists in a negative relation to truth:
that is, it forgoes its place in some systemic absolute that has
become domination’s mythology but reiterates that truths be known
if the world is to be understood let alone changed for the better.33
Here the loss of ‘pure truth’ causes a melancholic persistence of truth as an
ideal even though its absolute nature has been undermined by Enlighten-
ment modernity. Kelly notes Kelman’s acceptance of truth’s degraded and
contingent state, and yet his continuing acceptance of the need for some
kind of truth if we are to escape a postmodern impasse which traps agency.
In this perspective, truth becomes a critical process in Kelman’s work,
un¢xed and determined by contextual parameters, but crucial for social and
political engagement. This is not necessarily a ‘strategic essentialism’ but
rather parallels Butler’s view of universality as a ‘temporalised’ concept,34
that what are considered universals are subject to change and there is
competition between di¡erent versions. As Lloyd describes it in relation to
Butler:
Because the universal is particular to a culture, there are competing
versions of the universal in existence at any one time. Di¡erent poli-
tical movements, for instance, articulate di¡erent conceptions of the
universal. They articulate alternative visions of the norms needed to
ensure a liveable life, and these rival visions vie for hegemony [. . .]
democracy thrives in a context of contestation and agonism. The
point is not just to accept the existence of rival ideas of the uni-
versal as a relativist might; the task is to endeavour to generate a
more encompassing universal out of these competing conceptions.35
Such a conception contributes to a notion of radical democracy which calls
for openness, openendedness and a ‘kind of constant mobilisation of the
range of radical social movements’36 in a persistent disruptive process of
modi¢cation and change. Butler, in e¡ect, ‘emphasises contestation and dis-
agreement and rejects the idea that democracy is ultimately attainable’37 in
any stable or ¢nal sense.
I contend that Kelman’s ¢ction engages similar terms and perspectives in
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its melancholy knowledge. It contests the convergence and resolution of
con£ict and is open ended in the disputes it stages within itself:
I dont have any doubts. My doubts ceased a long while ago. I am
an instrument of all that is ¢ne and far-sighted. I receive almost
twice as much of the provender of survival as do my brother and
sister-in-law and nephew and niece all rolled up into one neat
bundle. And we are all to be at one, yes, at peace, reconciled, fully.
Says who? Says me. I say it. I say to my big brother, dont for fuck
sake do what you are doing but listen to me as an equal and let us
talk to each other, and in that talking we shall be ¢nding the way
ahead.
What a pile of fucking shite! What a pile of absolute gibbers! The
very idea that such forms of con£ict can be so resolved! This is
straight bourgeois intellectual wank. These liberal fucking excesses
taken to the very limits of fucking hyping hypocritical tollie.38
The idea that there can be agreement in unequal economic circumstances is
quickly and hyperbolically negated here as Patrick Doyle, the working-class
teacher, censures the self-righteous hegemony of liberal class-blindness. In
such moments Kelman’s subjects profess the lack of a universal viewpoint
and demonstrate the vulnerability of their own mastery of the world, their
knowledge of it and agency in it, which is lost in the multiple veracities of
interpretation and understanding. Where Kelly gleans this as the loss of
Enlightenment truth, Kelman’s texts present a more ambivalent case as to
the grand implications of this claim, particularly in relation to the under-
pinning of a melancholy selfhood. Loss of truth is something frequently
admitted in these ¢ctions, exempli¢ed on an individual level, for example,
by Sammy’s proclamations regarding his shoes in How late: on page one he
moans that someone has stolen his ‘new pair of leathers’ and replaced them
with ‘an auld pair of trainer shoes’ while he is sleeping o¡ a drinking
session; on page 247 he admits ‘Nay cunt stole his shoes’. The ‘good
leather’ truth becomes the ‘auld trainer’ truth, well-worn and fragile, the
veracity of which is lost in the vagaries of inebriation. This staging of the
loss of truth undermines its ultimate existence, as although the truth of the
matter seems reinstated, its adjustment challenges our security in its singular
nature.
The loss of truth is not an unavowed loss of the kind which promotes a
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melancholic subjectivity; we are well-versed in this postmodern condition,
and it is often playful, polemical and a fact of these narratives. What can
be said to be unavowed here is the masculinised nature of this lost truth,
founded as it is on an Enlightenment conception of reason exposed by
feminist philosophers as characterised as masculine. Reason and rational
attaining of truth is foundational to the history of modern Western philo-
sophy from Descartes onwards, so ‘the fact that the male-female distinction
has been used to symbolise the distinction between reason and its oppo-
sites’39 delineates women’s historical symbolic exclusion from rationality and
the ability to discern truth; ‘what passes as an egalitarian [and universal]
ideal is, in fact, a covert privileging of maleness’.40 Kelman is not averse to
illustrating the loss of this putatively universal truth; however, it is its
masculinised symbolism that is unacknowledged and the loss of the asso-
ciated masculine privilege. Further to this, the truth produced by a parti-
cular Left, socialist-tending, working-class masculine perspective, based on
the kind of collective trade unionism brought about by workers in heavy
industries and other male-dominated work places, though ideal in its evoca-
tion, makes available a radical political critique of contemporary neo-liberal
individualism and its concomitant erosion of collective rights and liberties.
As with McRobbie’s young women and the loss of feminism, Kelman’s
men, forced to relinquish this perspective and its critical power in order to
become legible in the neoliberal order, are melancholically constituted by
their ungrievable loss of radical working-class masculine identity.
Reference to the masculinised nature of Kelman’s work is apparent in
popular responses which highlight the ‘inherently’ male characteristics of his
protagonists, particularly their drinking, smoking and bad language, their
anti-establishment polemic, as if such qualities were solely a male preserve.
Certainly the masculine style of Kelman’s characters could be read as a mel-
ancholic incorporation of a lost masculine object, in the manner of Butler’s
theorising of subjectivity; there is surely a willingness among a particular
cohort of his readers to a⁄rm that masculinity. There are also e¡orts among
critics, mentioned above, to challenge the monolithic nature of such inter-
pretations as in Neil McMillan’s assertion regarding Kelman’s ‘locating his
characters in ideologically feminine spaces of interiority, passivity and
pathos’,41 or Ben Knights’ observation that the Kelman’s male characters’
‘appeals to sympathy [are] usurping a conventionally feminine position’.42
In Simon Jenkins’ case, in his notorious attack on Kelman’s work on the
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occasion of his winning the Booker Prize for ¢ction, this challenge to the
masculine credentials of Kelman’s characters amounts to a polemical emas-
culation of the writer himself:
I can only assume that the judges were aspiring to some apogee of
political correctness. They greeted Mr Kelman as an inversion of
the norms, a Jilly Cooper of the gutter, a Barbara Cartland of the
Gorbals. They wanted to give awfulness a break. Here was a white
European male, acceptable only because he was acting the part of an
illiterate savage.43
The feminisation of literary ‘awfulness’ and ‘savagery’ here exposes a searing
white male assault on his sexed and raced others which does not omit class:
I once found myself alone in a no-smoking compartment of a corri-
dor train to Glasgow. An ambassador for that city lurched into the
compartment and crashed down opposite me. He took out a bottle
of cider, rolled himself a cigarette, lent across to me and belched
‘Ye git a light, Jimmy?’ [. . .] My reeking companion demanded
attention like a two-year-old. He told me his so-called life story
[. . .] Reading Mr Kelman’s book was a similar experience. (p. 20)
If, as in Butler’s terms, via Hegel, ‘it is only through the experience of recog-
nition that any of us becomes constituted as socially viable beings’,44 then in
this passage Jenkins’ apprehension of the apocryphal Glaswegian, and by
extension Kelman’s characters, amounts to a withdrawing of recognition of
their humanness: that they are ‘like two-year-olds’ implies their lack of attain-
ment of the necessary qualities of adulthood which nominally de¢ne the
human; and the positing of a ‘so-called life story’ denies the existence of an
appropriately identi¢able personal history. As Butler argues, ‘certain humans
are recognised as less than human, and that form of quali¢ed recognition
does not lead to a viable life. Certain humans are not recognised as human
at all, and that leads to yet another order of unlivable life’ (p. 2). In these
terms humanness is the loss I am reading into Kelman’s ¢ctions, his
presentation of unliveable lives, as lucidly illustrated by Jenkins. These lives
are unliveable because they ‘take place outside the liberal consensus of Jenkins’
notion of both life and culture’;45 in this class-based analysis they are not
recognised as viable. However, it is also obvious here that his attempts to
CAROLE JONES
102
emasculate Kelman and his work serve to strengthen the notion that the
‘human’ itself has often been a masculinised concept, further placing a mas-
culine loss as a signi¢cant locus in Kelman’s writing.
The melancholic, unavowed loss of working-class community and values
can be understood in terms of the loss of a certain kind of masculine iden-
tity. Across the oeuvre of his novels, Kelman engages this loss increasingly,
if incrementally; there is a gradual movement away from the model of hege-
monic male identity in which power, strength, control and autonomy are
the privileged signi¢ers of male dominance. That is, the status of the central
male character moves from relative nearness to the discursive centre of male
power toward its margins. From archetypal working-class family man Rab
Hines through single, precariously-employed teacher Patrick Doyle to unem-
ployed Sammy who has lost his girlfriend and his eyesight, the trajectory
continues outwards via the displaced and persecuted anonymous narrators
of Translated Accounts, ‘unassimilatit alien’ (p. 37) immigrant Jeremiah
Brown working for ‘the wage of an adolescent’ (p. 173), and on to Kieron
Smith, a boy presented up to the age of twelve who only glimpses mascu-
line freedom and responsibility through his grandfather and father. Most
recently, in the novel Mo said she was quirky Kelman achieves the greatest pos-
sible distance from the centre of hegemonic masculinity with a female cen-
tral character, Helen, where signi¢cant males have no directly apprehensible
existence, only as reported by her.46
This mapping of a loss of male power across Kelman’s novels can be
linked to a purportedly nostalgic yearning for a kind of heroic masculinity,
often culminating in the closing pages in ambivalent fashion. That these
characteristic moments sometimes involve reference to ¢gures in literary or
popular ¢ctions and histories or other authoritative texts such as the bible
signal an engagement with narrative paradigms as tools with which to con-
struct a coherent model of male identity. These are moments of longing
which defer to lost ideals and desirable aspirations of manhood. However,
these references are constructed so that the myth of heroism is punctured in
the moment of its iteration.47 For example, in the ¢nal scene of A Disa¡ec-
tion, as Patrick runs away from police who may or may not be chasing him,
and fantasises about revolutionary violence, he considers the temptation of
suicide with allusion to a biblical precedent: ‘What is that story in the bible
about a guy who commits suicide. Is there a story in the bible about a guy
who commits suicide. Who is that guy who commits suicide, as a thing to
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be committed’ (p. 337). No question marks frame these questions, fore-
going the pause for answers and their necessity, and constructing an open-
ended discourse of uncertain trajectory and hierarchy; answers are not the
point, as the reader is left not knowing if Samson or Judas, and the very dif-
ferent implication of their stories, is being referred to. However, the search
for precedent signals a yearning for a frame of interpretation, in this case
whether the ‘temptation of suicide’ sets Patrick as betrayer or betrayed.
Jeremiah’s last words refer to beloved folk hero Billy the Kid: ‘But being
an outlaw is a serious a¡air. If anybody with a medical interest ever did a
survey of these poor unfortunates it would reveal that the vast majority die
of pulmonary diseases brought about by nervous disorders. Take Billy the
Kid’ (p. 437). This connects with Kieron’s grandad’s breathing problems in
Kieron Smith, Boy. At the very end of this long novel, Kieron, who has a
passion for dangerous climbing, fantasises about being saved from falling by
his deceased grandfather’s spirit:
Maybe a bad spirit would make me do it [. . .] if it was a ronepipe
and ye were getting to the very top and the spirit just blew the
wind and knocked ye o¡. So yer granda would be there, his spirit
would come to yer rescue, maybe a breath of wind or a hard blow-
ing wind, to stop ye hitting the ground heid ¢rst, ye would land
one foot at a time, nice and soft, or else in a big pile of sacks and
just get up and walk away, Oh that was lucky, and it would be,
except if it was him, yer granda. (p. 422)
These ¢nal words evoke a complex fantasy; in mourning his dead grand-
father, Kieron desires his transcendence of death, and yearns for the
triumph of mind or spirit over body which is the enduring legacy of the
ideal masculinity his grandfather embodies. However, the scenario does
admit that his grandfather is dead, an acknowledgment that signals a possi-
bility of mourning and a beginning of the process of grieving where loss
can be declared and the melancholic state, to a certain extent, dealt with.
These three conclusions, then, rather than signalling a sentimental nos-
talgia for past masculine ideals, enact a breaking of attachment to those lost
ideals and inaugurate the conditions for a process of mourning which for
Butler enables the subject to ‘re-enter the world [. . .] as one who under-
stands her dependency on others’.48 Where the e¡ect of melancholia ‘appears
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to be the loss of the social world, the substitution of psychic parts and anta-
gonisms for external relations among social actors’,49 mourning enables a
way back through a ‘redirecting of rage against the lost other’ instead of the
self, ‘de¢ling the sanctity of the dead for the purposes of life, raging against
the dead in order not to join them’ (p. 193). Kelman’s protagonists’ sever-
ing of attachments may not appear to us as rage in these instances, yet
crucially positioned at the open-ended conclusions of these texts, these
moments direct us to look beyond the protagonists and point to a re-engage-
ment with the world, a process Butler projects as survival. In the case of
Kieron, this is even enacted in a ‘fall’, albeit a fantasised one, but suggestive
all the same of originary biblical moments of leaving paradise and entering
the world.
According to Butler this process of mourning as a re-connection with
the world for the constitutively melancholic subject is a cornerstone of a
critique of the autonomous subject:
Survival does not take place because an autonomous ego exercises
autonomy in confrontation with a countervailing world; on the con-
trary, no ego can emerge except through animating reference to
such a world. Survival is a matter of avowing the trace of loss that
inaugurates one’s own emergence. To make of melancholia a simple
‘refusal’ to grieve its losses conjures a subject who might already be
something without its losses, that is, one who voluntarily extends
and retracts his or her will. Yet the subject who might grieve is
implicated in a loss of autonomy that is mandated by linguistic and
social life; it can never produce itself autonomously. From the start,
this ego is other than itself; what melancholia shows is that only by
absorbing the other as oneself does one become something at all.
[. . .] To accept the autonomy of the ego is to forget that trace; and
to accept that trace is to embark upon a process of mourning that
can never be complete, for no ¢nal severance could take place with-
out dissolving the ego.50
Butler’s theory asserts the relational condition of the subject, that it only
emerges through its relations with others. Kelman’s ¢ctions demonstrate the
same radical anti-essentialist point; I contend that as an oeuvre his novels
mark this moment of the inauguration of mourning, and so deliberately
refuse the isolated autonomy of a liberal humanist model of subjectivity.
JAMES KELMAN’S MELANCHOLIC POLITICS
105
Read as melancholics, Kelman’s characters represent the process of the con-
stitution of the subject and its subjugation to power, its relationality and the
necessity of acknowledging, not disavowing, its losses.
In such an interpretation Kelman’s characters resound with the struggle
against a toxic individualism that can, in e¡ect, make you ill. Kelman’s
stance entertains the possibility of a return to a di¡erent sociality which
recognises and works with the ‘precariousness’ of life. The failure and falli-
bility of Kelman’s characters are crucial in developing this alternative per-
spective on social and political reality, one answer to Butler’s quest for a
new vision of humanness:
If we stay with the sense of loss, are we left feeling only passive and
powerless, as some fear? Or are we, rather, returned to a sense of
human vulnerability, to our collective responsibility for the physical
lives of one another? The attempt to foreclose that vulnerability, to
banish it, to make ourselves secure at the expense every other
human consideration, is surely also to eradicate one of the most
important resources from which we must take our bearings and ¢nd
our way.51
The vulnerability of Kelman’s characters, acknowledged in their breaking of
their attachment to lost heroic ideals, not only creates political and ethical
possibilities, but realises what Homi Bhabha sees as a kernel of rebellion
inspiring the melancholic. For Bhabha melancholia is not a form of pas-
sivity, but ‘a mental constellation of revolt’: for him the narrative of the
colonised says, ‘My revolt is to face the Life of literature and history with
the scraps and fragments that constitute its double, which is living as sur-
viving, meaning as melancholia’,52 an apt description of the impulse and
realisation of Kelman’s ¢ction in its presentation of ‘countertypes of the
male normative’. Or as Butler also describes it, ‘Melancholia is a rebellion
that has been put down, crushed’,53 as the critical agency of the melan-
cholic, in its role as the state’s ‘psychic instrument’ (p. 191), preempts indivi-
dual insurrection by de£ecting anger and aggression against the self. As
Butler insists, ‘The revolt in melancholia can be distilled by marshalling
aggression in the service of mourning, but also, necessarily, of life’ (p. 191).
The exposed psyches of Kelman’s characters provide a snapshot of a
‘crushed rebellion’ which still contains a trace or residue of a lost insur-
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rection, the resistance of regulatory norms, ‘like a long forgotten and only
momentarily accessible memory which nevertheless o¡ers an understanding
of the tormented landscape of contemporary [identity]’.54 As Butler argues
regarding the ‘plaints’ of the melancholic, Kelman’s narratives can be
thought of as ‘nascent political text[s]’55 in their deft representation of the
alienating process. At this ‘juncture for critique’ these ¢ctions present the
reader with the uncomfortable limits of liveable life in the balance, raising
questions about the limits of the human itself as the boundary between
inner and outer life is insistently interrogated and the relation between the
psyche and the social exposed in all its complexity. Though apparently
inward-looking, Kelman’s subject is ex-centric, existing on that boundary
where its constitutive relations with the world and its others take place ^
that is, from where its ongoing subjectivisation occurs ^ and from where it
never escapes.
The loss of a delusional autonomy is painful, and, moreover, I have inter-
preted this loss as a masculine one, instigated by and making reference in its
purview to the losses of absolute truth, an idealised working-class masculine
identity attached to a radical political world view, and the privileging of the
masculine which characterises the Enlightenment self of modernity. I have
suggested that Kelman’s novels map a trajectory of this masculine loss
which culminates in the publication of Mo said she was quirky with its female
central character. Does this text, then, symbolise the acceptance of that loss
of masculine autonomy, and recognition of the fact of Butler’s assertion that
‘it is only by absorbing the other as oneself does one become something at
all’?56 Is giving prominence to the protagonist Helen an acknowledgment of
the trace of the other within Kelman’s literary corpus?
In the title Helen exists as a trace; it refers to Mo, Helen’s partner, and
his opinion of her and she has no substance, not even being named. How-
ever, the novel is directed through Helen’s consciousness and it is only
through her that we encounter Mo, that we know anything about him. And
in fact, this is signalled in the title as its indirect form refers to Helen’s in-
direct discourse, characteristic of the novel. This is not his narrative, then;
he is one of its objects, and a fairly minor one. Giving over the title to him
would seem to have other signi¢cance. Moreover, the melancholic relation
here does not concern him but Helen’s brother Brian, from whom she has
been estranged for many years. The instigation of the narrative is a curious
event where Helen thinks she recognises Brian as one of two homeless men
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who cross the road in front of her taxi when she is on her way home from
her late shift working in a casino. The main part of the narrative concerns
her memories of Brian and wondering if she could incorporate him into her
already impossibly demanding life and cramped living space. At the end of
the novel, on her next journey home she leaves the taxi to look for him and
there is an inconclusively presented encounter in which she is violently re-
pelled by the man she believes to be Brian who then disappears:
She grabbed his left arm, grasped it tightly, clinging onto him, not
even hearing his voice just like what he was saying, what was he say-
ing? she didnt know and he muttered something and swung round,
locked his right hand on her throat for her so to let go, to make
her let go his arm, and her trying to gulp, she was choking and
clawing scratching at his hand. His grip was locking o¡ her breath
and she was forced backwards how he was forcing her backwards,
till she staggered and crumpled to the ground, the other one shout-
ing, whatever he was shouting. Then she was lying on her side but
seeing to the sky. The tall skinny one was bending over her but it
was all just shadows and spots, and she stayed lying there, and
when her eyes were open properly the two of them had vanished.
(p. 229)
Helen’s longing for connection and relation with Brian is set against this
refusal. His resistance to interpellation ^ ‘she clapped her hand on his
shoulder . . . he tried to shrug her o¡’ ^ succeeds in that we never ¢nd out
if it really is Brian. His aggression points to a violent maintaining of his
independence and separateness from her. For Helen, though, connection has
deep signi¢cance; ‘If she missed him now she would never ¢nd him again
[. . .] Her entire life, the strangest strangest feeling like never ever, destined
never, how her life never, would never begin’ (p. 228, emphasis in original).
This dramatic and esoteric deduction makes no logical sense, as she herself
points out: ‘That was so so strange, never to begin and here she was with a
six-year-old daughter’. However, in the context of melancholia, her desire to
begin her life can be interpreted as a need to escape the melancholic cycle
and inaugurate the process of mourning the losses of a despairing, unlive-
able life by connecting with her brother and acknowledging and stating
those losses: ‘She would tell him. Everything would be out in the open’. In
Brian’s refusal of connection, this scene plays out a male autonomy ¢gured
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as homeless, outcast and spectral, accompanied by its double rather than its
other.
Mo said she was quirky presents a dramatic climax to Kelman’s critique of
the autonomous male subject, putting its survival in doubt and staging its
disappearance. There are echoes here of the close of How Late it Was, How
Late where Sammy leaves Glasgow in a taxi and ‘that was him, out of
sight’ (p. 374). But rather than a demise, this scene can also be interpreted
as an inauguration of mourning for Sammy, a moving on in life. In Mo said
it is actually Helen who reminds us of Sammy when in her prone state at
the end she can only see ‘shadows and spots’ (p. 229), as Sammy in the
opening paragraph of How Late was ‘seeing all kinds of spots and lights’ (p.
1). The spectral male disappearance which closes Mo said holds no hope for
the autonomous male, but, surprisingly for Kelman, the novel does present
us with an alternative model of masculinity in Mo, the male agent of the
title. Signi¢cantly, he is not white, but a gregarious Pakistani man who
works as a waiter, and is always talking and laughing, making jokes and
playing games with Helen and her daughter Sophie. As strongly connected
with the community, he is unable to walk down the street without chatting
to friends and strangers alike, and he makes and repairs things from the
spare parts he randomly collects. He converts the large cupboard into a bed-
room for Sophie in their cramped £at; this is surely a sign of their poverty,
but, moreover, also a symbol of his constructive accommodation of the
child in his life, of his care and connection. Outward-looking and full-of-
life, immersed in the social, Mo is the antithesis of the melancholic, and as
such he is prioritised in the title. He symbolises the beginning of Kelman’s
turn to the future of masculinity, to imagining a liveable life beyond the dis-
appearance of the autonomous masculinised subject.
Melancholia has been a signature of Kelman’s writing, inherent in its
labelling, for instance, as ‘workerist lament’.57 In a way, this is accurate,
though not in the pejorative manner intended. As a ‘passionate or demon-
strative expression of grief’ (OED), Kelman’s mournful lament can be read
as a turn away from melancholia and therefore as a protest against attach-
ment to the past. The melancholic subjectivity he presents connects with the
loss of male power and privilege, yet the acknowledgement of that loss that
I identify here prompts recognition of vulnerability which potentially opens
out to the possibility of a more liveable life, in Butler’s words. Her theoris-
ing of melancholia as a social issue and the psyche as a battleground enable
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constructive new perspectives on the radical nature of Kelman’s writing as
political critique.
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